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Does Information Change Attitudes Towards Immigrants?∗
Alexis Grigorieff† Christopher Roth‡ Diego Ubfal§
Abstract
Strategies aimed at reducing negative attitudes towards immigrants are at the core
of integration policies. A large literature shows that misperceptions about the size
and characteristics of immigrants are common. A few papers have implemented
interventions to correct innumeracy regarding the size of the immigrant population,
but did not detect any effects on attitudes. We study whether providing information
not only about the size, but also about the characteristics of the immigrant popu-
lation can have stronger effects. We conduct two online experiments with samples
from the US, where we provide half of the participants with five statistics about
immigration. This information bundle improves people’s attitudes towards current
legal immigrants. Most effects are driven by Republicans and other groups with
more negative initial attitudes towards immigrants. In our second experiment, we
show that treatment effects persist one month later. Finally, we analyze a large
cross-country survey experiment to provide external validity to the finding that in-
formation about the size of the foreign-born population is not enough to change
policy views. We conclude that people with negative views on immigration before
the intervention can become more supportive of immigration if their misperceptions
about the characteristics of the foreign-born population are corrected.
Keywords: Biased Beliefs, Survey Experiment, Immigration, Policy Preferences.
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Motivation
A large proportion of the population of the United States and Western Europe views
immigration as one of the most pressing issues facing their country. For instance, more
than three quarters of British citizens want to reduce immigration (Blinder 2015), while
more than forty percent of Americans are dissatisfied with the level of immigration in the
US (Gallup 2016). Political parties and politicians who have tapped into these concerns
have gained support in the last few years, such as the Front National in France, the
Northern League in Italy or Donald Trump in the United States.
Even though immigration is a central issue in many national elections, voters remain
highly misinformed both about the size (Citrin and Sides 2008; Herda 2010; IpsosMori
2014) and about the characteristics of the immigrant population (Blinder 2015; Herda
2015, 2018).1 Indeed, there is evidence that these misperceptions have been recently
growing in the United States, driven by politically conservative Americans (Herda 2019b).
Both the perceived size and characteristics of the immigrant group could be a source
of collective threat for natives, which may contribute to the formation of negative at-
titudes towards immigrants (Quillian 1995). Misperceptions about these attributes can
thus exacerbate prejudice and hamper the integration of immigrants into society. While
beliefs and attitudes towards immigrants only represent one of the many forces driving
assimilation dynamics, their importance cannot be disregarded (Drouhot and Nee 2019).
Our paper studies the effects of an information package that corrects people’s beliefs
about both the proportion and the characteristics of immigrants in the United States.
We test whether this information treatment can change people’s beliefs about immigrants
and their policy preferences regarding immigration. Our findings indicate that this infor-
1Throughout the text, we define immigrants as people living in the country, who were not born in
that country.
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mation package is effective at correcting misperceptions, and it affects the immigration
policy preferences of Republicans and of those who generally opposed immigration be-
fore the intervention. We present evidence that information merely about the size of
the immigrant group is not enough to generate significant effects, and we conclude that
correcting misperceptions about the characteristics of immigrants is a more promising
intervention.
Related Literature
A large literature in economics, political science and sociology shows that people tend to
over-estimate the size of minority groups (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005; Gallagher
2003; Herda 2010; Kunovich 2017; Laméris et al. 2018; Lawrence and Sides 2014; Nadeau
and Niemi 1995; Nadeau, Niemi and Levine 1993; Sides and Citrin 2007). Theories of
inter-group threat posit that people feel more threatened when they perceive a larger size
of the minority group (Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Quillian
1995), and several empirical papers discuss whether size misperceptions could be cor-
related with negative attitudes towards minorities (Citrin and Sides 2008; Hjerm 2007;
Hooghe and De Vroome 2015; Laméris, Hipp and Tolsma 2018; Semyonov et al. 2004).
Based on this argument, we would expect that an intervention correcting people’s
misperceptions about the size of the immigrant group will improve attitudes towards
immigrants. However, this hypothesis has been empirically tested by Sides and Citrin
(2007) and Hopkins, Sides and Citrin (2019), and they have found that correcting mis-
perceptions about the size of the immigrant group has only limited effects on people’s
attitudes towards immigrants.
Theories of social identification and social identity (Stets and Burke 2000) suggest that
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what matters for the formation of preferences about an out-group is not the perceived
size of the group, but the perceived characteristics of that group. This intuition can lead
to an extension of inter-group threat theories, where the feeling of threat derives not only
from the size, but also from the perceived characteristics of the minority group. The
argument is supported by recent studies pointing out that group size is not the only or
even the most relevant source of misperception regarding minorities, and that there is
a high degree of innumeracy for other dimensions related to the characteristics of the
immigrant group (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva 2018; Blinder 2015; Herda 2015, 2018).
Therefore, correcting misperceptions about the characteristics of immigrants may be a
more effective way to generate a change in attitudes.
Our paper contributes to this literature by studying the effects of a comprehensive in-
formation package that corrects people’s beliefs about the proportion of immigrants and
their characteristics. To select the relevant characteristics of immigrants that we include
in our information package, we rely on work in political science (Bansak, Hainmueller
and Hangartner 2016; Blinder 2015; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) and sociology (Flo-
res and Schachter 2018; Schachter 2016). Blinder (2015) investigates who people have in
mind when they think of immigrants, while Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014), Flores and
Schachter (2018) and Schachter (2016) employ conjoint experiments and randomize pro-
files of hypothetical individuals with different characteristics in order to measure support
for each particular attribute. The evidence indicates that non-Hispanic white Americans
prefer immigrants who are not unemployed, who speak English and who are not undoc-
umented.2 These empirical findings are supported by theoretical work indicating that
2A large literature has studied the determinants of people’s attitudes towards immigrants (Alba,
Rumbaut and Marotz 2005; Hainmueller, Hiscox and Margalit 2015; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Previ-
ous studies have focused on characteristics such as age, media exposure, competition in the labor market,
exposure to immigrants, education or income that are correlated with people’s attitudes towards immi-
grants (Card, Dustmann and Preston 2012; Citrin et al. 1997; Haaland and Roth 2018; Mayda 2006;
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the native-born population subjectively picks a number of characteristics to define who
is an insider and who is not. This subjective sense of similarity, or symbolic belonging
(Schachter 2016), determines natives’ conception of the “deserving” immigrant.3
Main Hypotheses
Our intervention aims to correct misperceptions about the size and the characteristics of
the immigrant population. Our first hypothesis is that these misperceptions exist and
that we can correct them by providing credible information. This is the first step in our
theory of change, which we test in two ways. First, we study whether our experimental
group updates their beliefs about the statistics we provide in the short term, and whether
this update in beliefs persists one month later. Second, we estimate the treatment effects
on beliefs about the size of the immigrant group and characteristics of immigrants that
are directly linked to the information provided.
Our second hypothesis is that our intervention can also change beliefs about more
general characteristics of immigrants that are not directly linked to the information pro-
vided. We hypothesize that people can develop more positive beliefs about immigrants if
the information provided in the treatment makes them realize that immigrants living in
the country are similar to the “deserving” immigrant category they have formed in their
minds. This would be in line with the work on symbolic belonging.
Our third hypothesis is that our intervention might also affect immigration policy
Mayda and Facchini 2009). Other papers have included the real or the perceived size of the immigrant
group as a key correlate (Gallagher 2003; Hjerm 2007; Hooghe and De Vroome 2015; Semyonov et al.
2004).
3It is important to note that while our results are in line with the notion of a “deserving” immigrant
category, our interventions do nothing to encourage moralizing classifications or to advocate support for
only one category of immigrants. Andrews (2018) studies how the combination of expanded immigration
enforcement and good/bad moralizing classifications can affect undocumented immigrants. Menjívar and
Lakhani (2016) show how the process of applying for legal status can trigger enduring changes by which
immigrants try to behave according to the “deserving” immigrant profile.
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preferences. This third step in the theory of change will be observed if the change in
people’s beliefs translates into a change in preferences regarding policy. In this case, we
hypothesize that there could be important heterogeneity in results by political affiliation.
On the one hand, there could be a ceiling effect given that Democrats in the US have more
positive views regarding immigrants to begin with, and there is less room to change their
policy preferences. On the other hand, the literature on motivated reasoning (Taber and
Lodge 2006) posits that people who receive information which goes against their political
convictions might be less willing to update their beliefs than people for whom the infor-
mation is in line with their political orientation, which would indicate that Republicans
will actually react less to positive information about immigrants.4
We expect that, if there is a change in policy preferences, this will mainly happen
for policies regarding legal immigrants, and not for those regarding undocumented im-
migrants. Our hypothesis is that our experimental treatment makes people realize that
immigrants are more similar to themselves than they originally thought. This will hold
for a general immigrant category, and would not apply directly to the particular sub-
group of undocumented immigrants, which according to the evidence cited above, is not
considered part of the “deserving” immigrant category.
In the main analysis, we focus on three families of outcomes that allow us to test these
hypotheses: people’s beliefs regarding the variables directly targeted by the intervention,
their general beliefs about immigrants, and their policy preferences.5 We complement
these families of outcomes with two behavioral measures: donations to a pro-immigrant
charity, and willingness to sign a petition in favor of increasing the number of green cards.
4An influential paper has documented the existence of backfire effects (Nyhan and Reifler 2010),
where people’s beliefs actually get reinforced in the face of contradictory evidence. However, recent
evidence indicates that these type of backfire effects might not be so common (Guess and Coppock 2019;
Wood and Porter 2019).
5A precise definition of the different families can be found in the Online Appendix.
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The use of real online petitions and donations is novel in the literature and can be widely
applied by researchers to examine people’s support for various policy proposals.
We pre-registered the experimental design, our hypotheses and our empirical specifi-
cations on the Social Science Registry before running our two online experiments. Almost
all of the analyses presented in this paper were pre-specified. We explicitly mention in
the paper which analyses were not part of the pre-analysis plan, which is available online.
We conduct two experiments with identical design to test our hypotheses: Experiment
1 uses an online sample from the US, which matches the US population in terms of age,
gender and region of residence. Experiment 2 uses a voluntary response sample recruited
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and includes the follow-up survey conducted four
weeks after the main experiment that we use to measure persistence in beliefs.6
Experiment 1: TNS Global
Sample We conducted Experiment 1 using a sample of the US population, which was
provided by TNS Global, a world-leading company in market research and political sur-
veys. This sample of 1,193 people living in the United States was obtained as a non-
probability quota sample to match the US population in terms of age, gender and region
of residence.7 All of the participants completed the survey online, using a link which was
provided by TNS Global.8
6Previous literature has cast doubt on whether interventions can have persistent effects on beliefs.
For example, Flores (2018) finds that the effect of anti-immigrant rhetoric by political elites does not
persist more than two weeks and attributes them to social desirability bias. However, Herda shows that
a classroom activity can correct misperceptions among students with effects that persist five weeks later;
although he does not examine whether the correction generates changes in attitudes or policy preferences
(Herda 2017, 2019a).
7The sample is not drawn from a probability-based sample, which means that it is not representative
in terms of variables not targeted by the quota.
8TNS provided us with 1,193 observations rather than 1,000 as we had specified in the pre-analysis
plan because they made an error in a count variable, which meant that they underestimated the number
of observations, and therefore accidentally provided us with a larger sample.
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To participate in the experiment, people had to pass a standard attention screener
at the start of the survey (Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014).9 The experiment was
run at the beginning of September 2016. The characteristics of the whole sample are
described in Table 1. Overall, 49 percent of participants are male, and the median age
in our sample is 39, which is very close to the national average of 38. Similarly, 81
percent of our participants identify as white, while the proportion identifying as white
in the US is around 77.5 percent.10 The median household income in the TNS sample
is $65,000, compared to $56,516 for the national estimate. Finally, 66 percent of the
TNS sample report being employed either part-time or full-time, which is close to the
employment-population ratio for the US (60 percent). Participants in the TNS sample
are more educated than the average American which is very common in online samples.
The randomization worked as expected and our samples are balanced across the treat-
ment and control group as can be seen in Table 1.
Design
Pre-Treatment Characteristics and Prior Beliefs The experiment is structured
as follows: First, all respondents are asked a few questions on how much they trust
official statistics, how many petitions they have signed in the last 12 months, and how
worried they are about immigration. Then, we ask them to estimate five statistics about
immigration: the proportion of immigrants in the US, the proportion of undocumented
immigrants in the US, the unemployment rate of immigrants, their incarceration rate,
9The attrition rate was very low (smaller than 2%). We find no evidence of differential attrition
across treatment arms.
10Our survey question includes mutually exclusive options for White, Hispanic, Black, Asian, or other
ethnicity. Therefore, our White category includes those who identify as whites, and we cannot distinguish
between Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Whites.
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and the proportion of immigrants who cannot speak English.11 To help participants give
plausible estimates for the unemployment rate and the incarceration rate of immigrants,
we tell them what these rates are for US-born citizens.12
Information Treatment Then, only the treatment group is told the correct answers
to these five questions. We remind participants in the treatment group of the estimate
they gave, before providing them with the correct answer. For instance, participants get
the following feedback for the question on the unemployment rate of immigrants:13
“You estimated that X percent of immigrants are unemployed. According
to the American Community Survey, around 6 percent of immigrants are
unemployed.”
Post-Treatment Beliefs We then ask all participants a series of questions on their
perception of legal and undocumented immigrants. We first measure people’s agreement
to the following three statements that are directly linked to the information provided
on the characteristics of immigrants: (i) Immigrants are more likely to commit crimes
than U.S. citizens; (ii) Immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than U.S. citizens;
and (iii) Immigrants generally learn English within a reasonable amount of time. We
then focus on beliefs regarding the other two variables targeted by the intervention:
views about the number of legal and undocumented immigrants. We ask participants to
choose their agreement with the following statements: (i) There are currently too many
11We chose these statistics for two main reasons. First, as we described in the related literature
section, there is evidence showing that people are particularly concerned about these issues. People
prefer immigrants who are not unemployed, who speak English and who are not undocumented. Second,
there exists Census data on these issues, which increases the reliability of the information we provide.
12This comparison reduces the concern that participants might be not able to translate their perception
into numerical terms when asked about absolute shares (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005). Both the
treatment and the control group receive this information, and the internal validity of our study is therefore
not compromised.
13To make the treatment more salient, we also present the feedback using bar charts, where we show
participants their estimate and the correct one.
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immigrants in the US; (ii) There are currently too many illegal immigrants in the US. We
also specifically measure people’s more general beliefs regarding immigrants. We asked
them about the effects of removing undocumented immigrants from the US and whether
“over the last 10 years, immigrants have produced more disadvantages than advantages
for the U.S. as a whole.”
Policy Views We then obtain participants’ views on specific immigration policies that
are at the core of the policy debate in the United States. First, we measure whether
people think that the number of legal immigrants coming to the United States each year
should be increased, reduced or remain the same, and whether they think that the number
of green cards available for immigrants coming to the United States each year should be
increased, reduced or remain the same.
On top of these questions on legal immigration, we also measure people’s views re-
garding unauthorized immigration. We measure people’s agreement to the statement that
“the government should devote a larger share of its budget to find illegal immigrants, and
to deport them” and to the statement that “Congress should pass a bill to give some
illegal immigrants living in the U.S. a path to legal status”. Finally, we measure people’s
views on whether the government should “deport all illegal immigrants back to their home
country, allow illegal immigrants to remain in the United States in order to work, but
only for a limited amount of time, or allow illegal immigrants to remain in the United
States and become U.S. citizens, but only if they meet certain requirements over a period
of time.”
Behavioral Measures We obtain two behavioral measures, introduced in a random
order. First, we give participants the option of signing an online petition in favor of
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facilitating legal immigration into the US, by increasing the number of green cards avail-
able for immigrants. We created two identical petitions on the White House website,
and we gave different links to participants in the treatment and control groups.14 This
is a credible measure of people’s support for immigration, as it requires some effort to
sign the petition (people need to create an online profile and to sign with their initials).
Furthermore, this behavioral measure involves a real petition with potentially concrete
consequences, which attenuates concerns about its external validity.
Second, we tell participants that ten percent of them will receive ten dollars, and that
they must specify how much money they want to keep for themselves, and how much
they want to give to the American Immigration Council, a non-profit organization which
“promotes laws, policies, and attitudes that preserve [the United States’] proud history
as a nation of immigrants” (American Immigration Council 2016), in case they receive
the ten dollars. Since people need to forgo some of their own money in order to support
the pro-immigrant NGO, this behavioral measure may be deemed more credible than
self-reported measures as a valid indicator of participant’s preferences (Bonica 2019).
After the behavioral measures, participants complete a standard attention check,
whose purpose is to assess how attentive participants were in the experiment. Then,
we ask participants in the treatment group to estimate again the same five statistics for
which we had elicited priors, so that we can test if they update their beliefs and how
well they remember the information. Finally, respondents complete a questionnaire on
demographics including variables such as gender, age, education and income.
14Only participants with a link can see the petition until at least 150 people sign it, after which it
becomes public. Moreover, if the petition reaches 100,000 signatures in 30 days, it is entitled to get an
official reply from the White House.
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Main Results: Experiment 1
Next, we explore the effects of information treatment by comparing the behavior of people
in the treatment group with that of people in the control group, estimating the following
equation:15
yi = π0 + π1Treatmenti +Π
TXi + εi
where yi is the outcome variable, and Treatmenti is the treatment indicator. For the
sake of clarity, we recode all of our outcomes such that higher values denote more positive
attitudes towards immigrants. We present all results controlling for the covariates Xi,
which we pre-specified for the balance test.16
We account for multiple hypothesis testing by adjusting the p-values using the “sharp-
ened q-value approach”.17 For each table, we also create an index of the outcomes, which
we regress on the treatment indicator.
Changes in Beliefs about Characteristics Targeted by the Intervention In this
section, we show that participants in the treatment group strongly update their beliefs
about the characteristics of immigrants targeted by the intervention, which is in line with
our first hypothesis.
In Figure 1, we show the average estimates that treated participants gave before
and after receiving the correct information. It is clear that, before the treatment, partici-
pants had biased beliefs about immigration. Their estimates were on average consistently
15Robust standard errors are used throughout the analysis.
16Among pre-specified covariates, we include measures of prior beliefs, which are missing for less than
2 percent of our respondents. We impute their values using the set of pre-specified controls displayed in
the balance table. In an earlier working paper version of the paper (Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal 2016),
we show that results remain very similar when we do not include the covariates Xi in the regression.
17For each family of outcomes, we control for a false discovery rate of 5 percent (Anderson 2008).
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higher than the actual values.18 For example, people over-estimated the percentage of
immigrants in the US by more than 20 percentage points.
Similarly, Panel A of Table 2 shows that, compared to control group respondents,
treated respondents are less likely to report that immigrants commit more crimes than
US citizens, that they take too much time to learn English, and that their unemployment
rate is higher than that of natives. All of these results are statistically significant; the
effect sizes are large and correspond to more than half of the gap between Democrats and
Republicans.19 Furthermore, treated participants are less likely to state that there are too
many legal and undocumented immigrants in the US. These effects are statistically sig-
nificant; their effect size is 0.10 and 0.24 standard deviations for legal and undocumented
immigrants, respectively.
Changes in General Beliefs about Immigrants In line with our second hypothesis,
the information treatment also has an effect on how people perceive immigration generally,
as shown in Table 3. People in the treatment group are less likely to say that immigrants
have produced more disadvantages than advantages for the US as a whole over the last
ten years. This result is significant at the one percent level, and the effect size is 0.14
standard deviations. While treated respondents are also more likely to say that there
would be no positive effects from removing undocumented immigrants, the coefficient
(0.09 standard deviations) is only marginally significant.20
18In Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal (2016), we show that more educated people, males and people who
live in zipcode areas with a small share of immigrants tend to have less biased beliefs about the share and
characteristics of immigrants. These findings are consistent with previous research on the determinants
of innumeracy in the US (Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz 2005; Laméris et al. 2018; Nadeau, Niemi and
Levine 1993) and Europe (Herda 2010).
19On average, Republicans have a significantly more negative view of immigrants than Democrats for
all our outcomes. This is in line with evidence that immigration enforcement is higher in states with a
larger share of Republican constituents (Moinester 2018).
20We asked respondents some additional questions on the respective contributions of legal and un-
documented immigrants, for which we find consistent effects. These estimates are reported in Grigorieff,
Roth and Ubfal (2016).
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Policy Preferences We next examine whether the information provision also affects
people’s views about immigration policy, the last step in our theory of change.
In Table 4, we observe that treated respondents become more likely to be in favor
of increasing the number of legal immigrants (0.13 standard deviations). However, we
see no effects on their views about the number of green cards to issue every year, or on
the legalization of immigrants. Similarly, participants’ views on deporting undocumented
immigrants and on the budget that should be devoted to it are not significantly affected
by the treatment. Overall, we find that the index of policy preferences is not affected for
the average participant in our experiment.
Petition and Donations In Table 5, we show that there is no treatment effect on the
probability to sign the online petition on the White House’s website in favor of increasing
the number of green cards available for immigrants.21 Similarly, approximately the same
fraction of people in the treatment and control group reported both intending to sign and
having signed the petition.22
Finally, we also find no statistically significant effects on people’s willingness to donate
to a pro-immigration charity, the American Immigration Council. The effect is 0.07
standard deviations, with a 95 percent confidence interval that includes 0 (the confidence
interval includes effects between -0.04 and 0.18).
The lack of significant effects on the two behavioral outcomes for the average respon-
dent are in line with the lack of effects on policy preferences reported above.
21About 10 percent of our sample actually ended up signing the petition. This means that we had
sufficient variation to detect treatment effects.
22The number of people who reported having signed the petition (25%) is higher than the number of
signatures, which can partly be explained by the fact that signing the petition was a multi-stage process.
People who signed the petition received a confirmation email containing a link that they had to click on
to confirm their signature. If they did not complete this second step, their signature was not counted.
People’s intention to sign the petition and their self-reported signature are strongly correlated with their
self-reported support for increasing the number of green cards for immigrants.
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Summary Overall, our first experiment shows that when people are provided with
information about the size and the characteristics of immigrants, they update their be-
liefs regarding the characteristics directly targeted by the intervention and more general
beliefs regarding legal immigrants. However, there are no significant changes in policy
preferences.
Experiment 2: MTurk Panel with Follow-up Survey
Sample
We replicated our first experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online
labor marketplace developed by Amazon.com, which is commonly used by academics to
recruit participants for online experiments. The pool of workers on MTurk is a voluntary
response sample, but still more representative of the US population than student samples
typically used in laboratory experiments. Moreover, MTurk participants have been shown
to be more attentive to instructions than college students (Hauser and Schwarz 2016),
and to give high-quality answers. There is some concern about the MTurk sample due
to the rising prevalence of bots, and MTurkers’ high levels of experience. However, our
findings that the MTurk sample and the sample from TNS global yield very similar results,
reassures us of the data quality and alleviates concerns about the peculiarities of each of
the samples.
The experiment was run in March 2016. In total, 802 participants completed it. Less
than 10 people dropped out after the treatment, which means that the attrition rate was
less than two percent. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the sample. Overall,
55 percent of participants are male. The median age in our sample is 35, while the
14
median age in the US is 38. Moreover, the median income in our sample is $45,000,
compared to $56,516 for the general population. Similarly, 78 percent of our participants
identify as white, while the proportion identifying as white in the US is 77.5 percent. The
proportion of unemployed people in our sample (8%) is slightly higher than in the general
population (5%), and the proportion of employed people (76%) is also larger than in the
general population (60%). Participants in the MTurk sample are younger, more likely to
be in the labor force (since both the share employed and unemployed are larger than in
the general population) and more likely to be Democrat.
Four weeks after our main experiment, we re-invited everyone who had completed the
main experiment for a follow-up survey. The proportion of participants who completed
both the main experiment and the follow-up is 88 percent. This high re-contact rate
indicates that it is possible to construct panels on MTurk with relatively low attrition.
The recontact rates are very similar for treatment and control groups, and statistically
indistinguishable (p-value = 0.708). The randomization worked and our samples are
balanced across treatment and control groups for both the sample in the main experiment
and the sample that completed the follow-up (Table 1).
Design
The design of Experiment 2 is almost identical to that of Experiment 1. There are only
a few differences that we discuss below.
Incentives and Attention Check In Experiment 2, we incentivize the pre-treatment
questions about immigrant characteristics. Participants receive 10 cents for each question
(this is 8 percent of the participation fee) if their estimate is within three percentage
points of the official value, which we obtained from the American Community Survey.
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Moreover, to avoid having participants look up the answers online, we only give them 25
seconds to answer each question. We do not include an attention check in Experiment
2. However, we find that response times are similar to those of Experiment 1, indicating
that respondents were not less attentive in this experiment.23
Follow-Up Study The key innovation in Experiment 2 is that we conduct a follow-up
study four weeks after the main experiment. This allows us to examine whether the
treatment effects persist over time. We ask people the same set of self-reported questions
on immigration as the ones they answered in the main experiment, and we also ask them
to estimate the same five statistics about immigration.24 This allows us to see whether
people in the treatment group remember the information provided.25
Results: Experiment 2
Main Survey For the main survey outcomes, we find fairly similar results to Experi-
ment 1. We formally test the equality of treatment effects across the two samples, and
only find a few cases where we reject the equality of coefficients. The main differences
compared to the findings from Experiment 1 are as follows: First, we find a larger and
statistically significant effect of the treatment on donations (although the confidence in-
terval overlaps with that of Experiment 1). MTurkers in the treatment group donated
on average 36 percent more ($0.42 more) to the American Immigration Council than
MTurkers in the control group. As shown in Column 5 of Table 5, this represents an
effect of 0.22 standard deviations. Second, we find a stronger effect on beliefs about
23Another piece of evidence indicating that MTurk data are of high quality is a very high correlation (of
around 0.8) between responses in the follow-up and in the main survey among control group participants.
24We provide the same incentives for each correct answer as in the main experiment.
25We randomize the order of the sections in the survey. Half of the sample estimate the five statistics
first, and then answer the set of self-reported questions on immigration, while the other half answer the
self-reported questions first. We find no significant order effects.
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characteristics directly targeted by the intervention, as illustrated in Table 2.
Follow-up Study We leverage the follow-up study to shed light on the persistence of
the effects of the information provision on beliefs and policy views. We first test the extent
to which MTurkers in the treatment group remember the information four weeks after the
main experiment. In Figure 2, we show that estimates are still fairly accurate four weeks
after the treatment. For instance, the average estimate of the proportion of immigrants is
15 percent in the follow-up, whereas the true value is 13 percent.26 Moreover, we find that
those respondents who were the most biased are the ones who update their beliefs the
most, even in the follow-up. We observe a clear linear positive relationship between the
revision of beliefs (the difference between priors in the main experiment and posteriors
measured one month later) and the size of the initial bias in the treatment group.27
We also show in Panel C of Table 2 that the effects on qualitative questions measuring
beliefs about immigrants targeted by the intervention persist four weeks after the treat-
ment, that they are statistically significant, and that they remain fairly large (about 0.2
of a standard deviation). We see slightly larger treatment effects on policy preferences
(mostly around 0.1 of a standard deviation) in the follow-up. However, they are not
statistically different from those in the main experiment.
Summary Our findings in Experiment 2 confirm, with a different sample, what we
found in Experiment 1. More interestingly, the follow-up experiment shows that the av-
erage effects of the information package on beliefs about immigrants are not ephemeral.
We now explore whether the null average effects on policy preferences are masking im-
26People in the control group do not update their beliefs in the follow-up, indicating that they did
not make the effort to look up the information we provided to the treatment group.
27It is worth noting that our measures of beliefs and attitudes towards immigrants are strongly
correlated with people’s self-reported policy preferences regarding immigration. These results were not
pre-specified and are available upon request.
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portant heterogeneity across different groups of participants.
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Experiments 1 and 2
In this section we study heterogeneity in treatment effects across different subgroups.
We focus on the indices for our main five families of outcomes. Since the requirements
in terms of statistical power are higher, and given that results are similar for our two
experiments, we pool both samples and present effects for the pooled sample.28 We
estimate the following equation, where interactioni refers to the pre-specified group of
interest, Xi is a vector of pre-determined characteristics; π1 captures the magnitude of
the heterogeneity in treatment effects, π2 measures the effect for the omitted group, and
π1 + π2 gives the treatment effect for the studied group:
yi = π0 + π1Treatmenti × interactioni + π2Treatmenti + π3interactioni +ΠTXi + εi
Political Affiliation In Panel A of Table 6, we show that people who self-identify as
Republican or people who neither identify as Democrat nor as Republican respond more
strongly to the information treatment than people who identify as Democrat.29 At the
bottom of the table, we report the p-value from the test for the null hypothesis that
there is no treatment effect for Republicans. We reject the null hypothesis at the five
percent level in all cases: Republicans exhibit statistically significant improvements in all
our main families of outcomes. The heterogeneity result can be partly explained by the
fact that Republicans have more negative values for all outcomes to begin with, which
28Table A1 presents disaggregated results.
29Republicans represent 28% of the pooled sample (32% of the TNS sample and 23% of the MTurk
sample), while the share of Democrats is 45% in the TNS sample and 58% in the MTurk sample. Both
the share and observable characteristics of Republicans and Democrats in treatment and control groups
are well balanced.
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implies that the information treatment is actually stronger for them.30
Initial Attitudes towards Immigrants In Panel B of Table 6, we show that partici-
pants from the TNS and MTurk samples who are particularly worried about immigration
tend to respond more strongly to the treatment. While not all interaction coefficients are
statistically significant in this case, we see a consistent pattern of larger effects.
Overall, we do not find evidence in favor of motivated reasoning theories or self-
confirmation bias: Republicans and participants who initially have more negative views
on immigrants update their beliefs and policy preferences more than people who have
more positive attitudes towards immigrants.
Other Sources of Heterogeneity In Panel C of Table 6, we examine whether par-
ticipants who have a high level of trust in official statistics respond more strongly to
information. Overall, we find no consistent evidence in this direction.31
Persistence of Heterogeneous Effects We find a consistent pattern of heterogeneous
treatment effects in the follow-up (See Panel C of Table A1).32 Even four weeks after
the treatment, the effects are stronger for Republicans, especially regarding their policy
preferences.
30In Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal (2016), we employ a machine learning algorithm to identify the most
significant sources of heterogeneous treatment effects (Athey and Imbens 2016). The algorithm confirms
that political affiliation is the factor that most strongly predicts heterogeneous responses to the treatment.
31In additional pre-specified analysis, we examine heterogeneous treatment effects by participants’
biases in beliefs using three different definitions of biases. We find that people with larger biases in
beliefs seem to respond more strongly to information. However, this effect is not statistically significant
for most families of outcomes, which could be due to measurement error as we do not know how people
weigh the biases for the five different statistics we measure. Results are available upon request.
32Our results are unlikely to be driven by experimenter demand effects for two reasons: first, demand
effects have been shown to be quantitatively small (de Quidt, Haushofer and Roth 2018; Mummolo and
Peterson 2019) and, second, both the heterogeneity of treatment effects and the persistence of effects
over time suggest that demand effects are unlikely to be causing the patterns in our data.
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Experiment 3: Cross-Country Experiment
We have provided evidence that a package including information on both the size of
the immigrant group and on the characteristics of immigrants can affect beliefs for the
average respondent and also policy preferences for those with more negative views on
immigration. We use a third experiment to show that information on size alone is not
enough to generate significant effects. Consistent with the previous literature, we find
evidence from the US in this direction, and we provide external validity for these results
by showing similar effects for other countries where the same experiment was conducted.
Description of the Dataset We use data from the Transatlantic Trends Survey
(TATS), which is a large representative survey on political attitudes conducted every
year in the US and in many other countries around the world. In particular, we focus on
two waves of the survey, the 2010 and 2014 waves, which included an experiment on the
effect of information about the size of the immigrant group.33
The 2010 wave of the Transatlantic Trends Survey was conducted in the United States,
Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands and Spain. In each country,
participants were randomly drawn from the adult population who had access to a landline.
The 2014 wave added Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Russia and Poland, but it did not include
Canada. In most countries, participants were randomly drawn from the adult population
who had access to a landline or a mobile phone.34 Importantly, more than 94 percent of
33The experiment was designed by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the main
results were graphically reported in a non-technical way in Wunderlich et al. (2010) and Stelzenmueller,
Isernia and Eichenberg (2014). The report did not include any regression or heterogeneity analysis.
34In Germany and in the UK, only people with access to a landline took the survey. In Poland and
Russia, participants were randomly selected from the general population, and face-to-face interviews
were conducted. Response rates for phone interviews ranged from 4 percent in France, the UK and the
Netherlands to 27 percent in the US. Face-to-face interviews had higher response rates: 49 percent in
Russia and 40 percent in Poland (Stelzenmueller, Isernia and Eichenberg 2014; Wunderlich et al. 2010).
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those who started the survey answered the main questions of interest.35
Information Treatment At the start of the survey, participants are asked which issues
they think are the most important ones facing their country, and how closely they follow
news on immigration. Then, only participants in the treatment group are informed about
the true proportion of immigrants in their country, before being asked whether they think
that there are too many immigrants in their country. Thereafter, all respondents are asked
a series of questions on their level of concern regarding immigration, their perception of
immigrants and on the legalization of immigrants. For example, people are asked whether
they are worried about legal and undocumented immigration, and whether undocumented
immigrants should be given the opportunity to obtain legal status.
Results In parallel with our first hypothesis, we first check whether the information
experiment embedded in the TATS affects beliefs regarding the size of the immigrant
group, the only variable directly targeted by the intervention. Column 1 of Table 7 shows
that this is the case. People who receive information about the share of immigrants in
the US become much less likely to say that there are too many immigrants in the country
(an effect of 0.33 standard deviations). We find a similar effect for the average respondent
across all other countries included in the survey (Column 4).36 This finding confirms that
the information treatment is effective at correcting misperceptions about the size of the
immigrant group.
However, we expected that this light information treatment, only correcting misper-
ceptions about the size of immigrant group, would not meaningfully shift people’s general
35In order to get as representative a sample as possible for each country, we use the probability weights
constructed by the Transatlantic Trends Survey. Our results are not affected in any way by the use of
these weights.
36Results are robust to the inclusion or not of control variables, and wave- and country-fixed effects.
The sample is well balanced across the treatment and control group as is highlighted in Table A2.
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beliefs about immigrants or their immigration policy preferences. In line with our ex-
pectation and the findings of the existing literature (Hopkins, Sides and Citrin 2019),
Columns 2-3 and 6-7 of Table 7 show that being informed about the proportion of im-
migrants in the country does not make people (in the US or in the other countries) less
worried about immigration. Moreover, Table 8 confirms that this treatment does not
change people’s immigration policy preferences.
Finally, Panel B of Tables 7 and 8 show that the effects on general beliefs and policy
preferences are not statistically larger for right-wing respondents. This stands in contrast
to the heterogeneous effects we found after providing information about both the size and
the characteristics of the immigrant group, which significantly affected policy preferences
for respondents with more negative views on immigration.
Conclusion
The main substantive contribution of our paper is to provide novel causal evidence on the
effects of misinformation about immigrants’ characteristics on people’s policy preferences.
We show that providing a package of information that includes not only the size of the
immigrant group, but also the characteristics of immigrants improves people’s general
beliefs about legal immigrants. We also see significant effects on policy preferences for
those groups with more negative attitudes towards immigration before the intervention.
Based on motivated reasoning theory, previous studies have hypothesized that a
stronger perception of threat can lead to more negative attitudes and generate larger
misperceptions. However, our findings provide evidence for the reverse causal mecha-
nism: innumeracy can cause negative attitudes towards immigrants. The result that a
reduction in misperceptions leads to less negative attitudes is consistent with a version of
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group-threat theories that view the perceived characteristics of immigrants as the source
of the threat.
Our findings have high policy relevance for at least two reasons. First, we show
that targeting relevant subgroups can be essential for successful information campaigns.
People with negative views on immigration (e.g., Republicans) become more supportive
of legal immigration if their misperceptions about the characteristics of the foreign-born
population are corrected. Second, we show that the type of information provided makes a
difference, and that including objective statistics about the characteristics of immigrants
can reduce social distance and thereby increase support for immigration. Interventions
focused on information only about the size of the immigrant group have not been effective
at affecting policy preferences.
The effects of information on beliefs persist after one month, which indicates that
information campaigns can have an effect that is not ephemeral. However, we do see
an important reduction in the size of the treatment effect after one month. Therefore,
we believe that, over a longer time horizon, the effects on beliefs could disappear due to
imperfect memory and the impact of competing pieces of information. To persistently
shift beliefs, political organizations would need to run information campaigns repeatedly.
Future research should complement our work in at least two ways: first, it is important
to grasp whether the effects of information on political attitudes depend on the credibility
of the agent who provides the information (e.g., the government, the media). Second, it
is crucial to understand how people process factual information compared to emotionally
loaded content.37 Answering these questions will be necessary to find the most effective
ways of fighting people’s misinformation on important issues, such as immigration.
37Flores (2018) shows that altering the source of negative statements about immigrants does not have
differential effects on attitudes, but changing the polarity of the message does, since he only finds an
effect for negative messages.
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Table 1: Balance Table: TNS and MTurk
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 2: follow-up
Treatment Control P-value Treatment Control P-value Treatment Control P-value
Income 62465 62083 0.834 49183 49003 0.930 49548 48538 0.645
Log Income 10.328 10.352 0.860 10.565 10.556 0.874 10.584 10.533 0.398
Age 40.769 40.303 0.541 35.263 34.389 0.264 35.706 34.883 0.334
Male 0.493 0.494 0.978 0.588 0.532 0.112 0.605 0.515 0.017
Household Size 2.875 2.978 0.201 3.624 3.540 0.389 3.565 3.523 0.691
Hispanic 0.042 0.045 0.763 0.039 0.033 0.662 0.040 0.032 0.601
Black 0.072 0.084 0.435 0.063 0.095 0.103 0.051 0.082 0.101
White 0.829 0.792 0.096 0.793 0.775 0.543 0.797 0.787 0.744
Christian 0.635 0.639 0.908 0.427 0.396 0.383 0.412 0.404 0.811
Full-time employed 0.517 0.519 0.928 0.583 0.565 0.613 0.590 0.567 0.537
Part-time employed 0.152 0.134 0.383 0.180 0.182 0.968 0.181 0.187 0.829
Unemployed 0.094 0.103 0.607 0.078 0.130 0.016 0.073 0.114 0.067
At least bachelor 0.488 0.479 0.748 0.449 0.481 0.364 0.466 0.509 0.261
Born in the US 0.948 0.945 0.782 0.951 0.941 0.530 0.946 0.939 0.662
Worried about immigration 2.768 2.805 0.469 2.759 2.839 0.202 2.791 2.830 0.563
Belief English: Prior 37.032 37.279 0.871 32.687 30.470 0.138 32.335 30.154 0.172
Belief Unemployed: Prior 24.592 23.971 0.649 22.403 18.240 0.002 21.704 18.404 0.023
Belief Share Immigrants: Prior 34.619 34.785 0.900 22.165 23.378 0.283 21.467 23.241 0.134
Belief Share Undoc. Immigrants: Prior 25.470 25.376 0.943 14.078 13.727 0.745 13.568 13.439 0.910
Belief Crime: Prior 18.211 19.306 0.389 12.846 11.857 0.312 12.440 11.604 0.416
Democrat 0.448 0.450 0.938 0.576 0.588 0.718 0.585 0.585 0.999
Republican 0.338 0.303 0.192 0.229 0.238 0.774 0.223 0.249 0.431
Neither Republican nor Democrat 0.214 0.247 0.176 0.195 0.174 0.440 0.192 0.167 0.383
We present the balance test for our samples from Experiment 1 (TNS sample) and Experiment 2 (MTurk sample main survey and follow-up).
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Treatment 0.269∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.052) (0.053) (0.046) (0.049) (0.031)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
Observations 1193 1193 1193 1193 1193 1193
Scaled Effect 0.690 2.574 0.567 0.410 0.367 0.701
B: Experiment 2
Treatment 0.185∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.062) (0.064) (0.056) (0.052) (0.040)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800
Scaled Effect 0.207 1.204 0.457 0.285 0.253 0.471
C: Experiment 2: follow-up
Treatment 0.117† 0.304∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗ 0.142∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.067) (0.067) (0.061) (0.058) (0.043)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.026] [0.001] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002]
Observations 695 695 695 695 695 695
All outcome variables are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation of the variable for the control group (Kling,
Liebman and Katz 2007). In other words, the coefficients represent the effect size in terms of standard deviations away from the
mean. We recode the variables such that high values correspond to positive attitudes towards immigrants. The scaled effect is
the treatment effect divided by the average difference in the answers given by Democrats and Republicans in the control group.
In Panel A, we display the results from Experiment 1. In Panel B, we display the results from Experiment 2. In Panel C, we
show results from the follow-up experiment from Experiment 2. We include the following control variables: log income, age,
gender, household size, indicators for race, religion, employment status and education, whether the respondent was born in the
US, a question capturing pre-treatment worries about immigration, a dummy variable for Democrats as well as a set of prior
beliefs about immigrants. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses, while the p-values adjusted for a false discovery
rate of five percent are presented in brackets. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Treatment 0.091† 0.143∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.049) (0.048) (0.040)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.032] [0.006]
Observations 1193 1193 1193
Scaled Effect 0.206 0.354 0.277
B: Experiment 2
Treatment 0.055 0.187∗∗∗ 0.121∗
(0.056) (0.052) (0.047)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.195] [0.001]
Observations 800 800 800
Scaled Effect 0.057 0.176 0.119
C: Experiment 2: follow-up
Treatment 0.127∗ 0.150∗ 0.139∗
(0.061) (0.054) (0.050)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.019] [0.011]
Observations 694 694 694
All outcome variables are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation of the variable for the control
group (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007). In other words, the coefficients represent the effect size in terms of
standard deviations away from the mean. The scaled effect is the treatment effect divided by the average
difference in the answers given by Democrats and Republicans in the control group. In Panel A, we display the
results from Experiment 1. In Panel B, we display the results from the main part of Experiment 2. In Panel C,
we show results from the follow-up experiment from Experiment 2. We include the same list of controls as in
Table 2. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses, while the p-values adjusted for a false discovery
rate of five percent are presented in brackets. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Treatment 0.125∗ 0.048 0.055 0.003 0.080 0.052
(0.050) (0.052) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.036)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.069] [0.424] [0.424] [0.687] [0.312]
Observations 1193 1193 1193 1193 1193 1193
Scaled Effect 0.267 0.082 0.089 0.004 0.161 0.086
B: Experiment 2
Treatment 0.163∗ 0.119∗ 0.062 0.034 0.039 0.060
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.047)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.032] [0.096] [0.419] [0.511] [0.511]
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800
Scaled Effect 0.197 0.125 0.067 0.034 0.033 0.060
C: Experiment 2: follow-up
Treatment 0.188∗∗ 0.121∗ 0.122∗ 0.128∗ 0.023 0.116∗
(0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.064) (0.044)
FDR-adjusted p-value [0.013] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.167]
Observations 694 694 694 694 694 694
See Notes to Tables 2 and 3. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 5: Main Effects: Online Petition and Donation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intention to sign Self-report: Sign Actual Sign-up Index: Petition Donation (z)
A: Experiment 1
Treatment -0.031 0.021 0.002 -0.005 0.067
(0.053) (0.055) (0.019) (0.050) (0.056)
FDR-adjusted p-value [1] [1] [1]
Observations 1193 1193 1193 1193 1193
Scaled Effect -.04 .03 - -.01 0.171
Control mean 0 0 0.112 0 0
B: Experiment 2: Main
Treatment 0.061 -0.069 -0.036† -0.004 0.222∗
(0.063) (0.054) (0.019) (0.054) (0.082)
FDR-adjusted p-value [.271] [.271] [.212]
Observations 800 800 800 800 800
Scaled Effect .09 -.15 - 0 0.363
Control mean 0 0 0.106 0 0
Outcome variables in Columns 1 and 2 are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation of the variable for the control
group (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007). In other words, the coefficients represent the effect size in terms of standard deviations
away from the mean. The scaled effect is the treatment effect divided by the average difference in the answers given by Democrats
and Republicans in the control group. In Panel A, we display the results from Experiment 1. In Panel B, we display the results
from Experiment 2. We include the same list of controls as in Table 2. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses,
while the p-values adjusted for a false discovery rate of five percent are presented in brackets. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
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Treatment 0.219∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.046 0.099 -0.126∗
(0.035) (0.043) (0.052) (0.070) (0.057)
Treatment × 0.207∗∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.201∗ 0.144 0.302∗∗∗
Republican (0.058) (0.073) (0.090) (0.108) (0.082)
Treatment × 0.134∗ 0.217∗ 0.285∗∗ -0.019 0.157†
Neither Rep nor Dem (0.061) (0.078) (0.094) (0.118) (0.094)
Republican -0.255∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.389∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.057) (0.068) (0.074) (0.060)
Neither Rep nor Dem -0.163∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.215∗ -0.405∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.057) (0.068) (0.083) (0.067)
B: Concerned with Imm.
Treatment 0.295∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.073† 0.132∗ -0.008
(0.024) (0.029) (0.038) (0.047) (0.037)
Treatment × 0.033 0.058 0.213∗∗∗ 0.057 0.092†
Concerned with immigration (0.034) (0.041) (0.052) (0.064) (0.053)
Concerned with immigration -0.385∗∗∗ -0.632∗∗∗ -0.064 -0.201∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗
(0.035) (0.043) (0.052) (0.060) (0.051)
C: Trust in statistics
Treatment 0.308∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.142∗∗ -0.000
(0.025) (0.031) (0.038) (0.047) (0.037)
Treatment × 0.026 0.063† 0.014 0.076† 0.044
Trust in statistics (0.027) (0.033) (0.037) (0.044) (0.036)
Trust in statistics -0.036† 0.023 -0.061∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025)
P-value (Tr + Tr× Republican) 0.000 0.001 0.035 0.003 0.003
P-value (Tr + Tr× Neither Rep nor Dem) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.402 0.681
P-value (Tr + Tr× Concerned) 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013 0.162
P-value (Tr + Tr× Trust Stat) 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.001 0.389
Observations 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994
All of the outcomes are indices. The definition of the indices is described in the Online Appendix. The outcomes from
the petition question are self-reported. All outcome variables are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation
of the variable for the control group (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007). In other words, the coefficients represent the
effect size in terms of standard deviations away from the mean. We include the same list of controls as in Table 2.
Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 7: Transatlantic Trends Survey: Beliefs and Worries about Immigration
US sample Non-US sample
Too many Worry Worry Too many Worry Worry
imm. legal imm. undoc. imm. imm. legal imm. undoc. imm.
Panel A: Main
Treatment 0.334∗∗∗ -0.172 -0.030 0.238∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.030
(0.073) (0.110) (0.125) (0.020) (0.036) (0.034)
Observations 1858 930 923 17549 6554 6537
Panel B: Right-wing
Treatment 0.368∗∗∗ -0.201 0.035 0.188∗∗∗ -0.057 -0.083
(0.087) (0.142) (0.182) (0.025) (0.046) (0.047)
Treatment × -0.088 0.069 -0.117 0.121∗∗ 0.097 0.133
Right-wing (0.143) (0.221) (0.230) (0.042) (0.073) (0.068)
Right-wing -0.325∗∗ 0.114 0.602∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.161) (0.159) (0.031) (0.051) (0.049)
Observations 1858 930 923 17549 6554 6537
We recode the variables such that high values correspond to positive attitudes towards immigrants. All
outcome variables are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation of the variable for the control
group (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007). In other words, the coefficients represent the effect size in terms
of standard deviations away from the mean. The outcome in Columns 1 and 4 is available for both rounds
of the survey, while the outcomes in the other columns are available for only one round. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 8: Transatlantic Trends Survey: Policy Preferences
US sample Non-US sample
Immigrants can Immigrants can More Immigrants can Immigrants can More
stay permanently be legalized Refugees stay permanently be legalized Refugees
Panel A: Main
Treatment 0.014 0.112 -0.088 0.028 -0.050 -0.018
(0.093) (0.104) (0.114) (0.035) (0.035) (0.029)
Observations 895 899 878 6521 6521 10356
Panel B: Right-wing
Treatment 0.010 0.061 -0.031 0.038 -0.039 -0.041
(0.119) (0.146) (0.137) (0.047) (0.046) (0.037)
Treatment × -0.0003 0.101 -0.133 -0.023 -0.025 0.056
Right-wing (0.186) (0.204) (0.218) (0.072) (0.069) (0.058)
Right-wing -0.140 -0.303∗ -0.449∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.151) (0.157) (0.052) (0.051) (0.040)
Observations 895 899 878 6521 6521 10356
All outcome variables in Panels A and B are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation of the variable for the
control group (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007). In other words, the coefficients represent the effect size in terms of standard


















































































































































































































Figure 1: This figure presents the prior and posterior beliefs about the statistics regarding
immigrants. On the left-hand side, Panel A presents results for the TNS sample. On the
right-hand side, Panel B shows results for the MTurk sample. The figures display the







































































Figure 2: This figure presents prior and posterior beliefs for the sample that answered
the four-week follow-up. We also present beliefs elicited in the four-week follow up.
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Online Appendix (Supplementary Electronic Material)
Summary of Results in the Online Appendix
We include here two additional tables mentioned in the text. The first one presents
results on heterogeneity of treatment effects for the two experiments separately, and for
the follow-up survey. The second one is the balance table for the experiment embedded in
the Transatlantic Trends Survey. Finally, the last section describes how we constructed
each family of outcomes.
1








Treatment 0.171∗∗∗ -0.030 -0.067 0.003 -0.173∗
(0.046) (0.060) (0.052) (0.084) (0.080)
Treatment × 0.183∗ 0.228∗ 0.223∗ 0.109 0.355∗∗
Republican (0.070) (0.092) (0.082) (0.132) (0.112)
Treatment × 0.201∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.228∗ 0.135 0.246†
Other Pol. (0.077) (0.100) (0.091) (0.144) (0.127)
Republican -0.218∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗ -0.584∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.069) (0.062) (0.098) (0.081)
Other Pol. -0.202∗∗∗ -0.186∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.258∗ -0.463∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.073) (0.066) (0.099) (0.087)
Observations 1193 1193 1193 1193 1193
p(Tr+ Tr × Rep) 0.000 0.004 0.013 0.267 0.020
p(Tr+ Tr × Neither Rep. nor Dem.) 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.238 0.462
B: Experiment 2
Treatment 0.292∗∗∗ 0.061 -0.060 0.197† -0.063
(0.054) (0.061) (0.060) (0.115) (0.080)
Treatment × 0.284∗∗ 0.154 0.270∗ 0.265 0.233∗
Republican (0.097) (0.112) (0.111) (0.178) (0.111)
Treatment × 0.042 0.091 0.264∗ -0.230 0.021
Other Pol. (0.098) (0.121) (0.125) (0.199) (0.138)
Republican -0.199∗ -0.268∗ -0.266∗ -0.457∗∗ -0.131
(0.087) (0.108) (0.110) (0.149) (0.101)
Other Pol.
Observations 800 800 800 800 800
p(Tr+ Tr × Rep) 0.000 0.024 0.027 0.001 0.026
p(Tr+ Tr × Neither Rep. nor Dem.) 0.000 0.147 0.064 0.843 0.710
C: Experiment 2 Follow-up
Treatment 0.255∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.101 0.166 -0.097
(0.058) (0.065) (0.064) (0.121) (0.085)
Treatment × 0.314∗∗ 0.229∗ 0.300∗ 0.205 0.271∗
Republican (0.102) (0.113) (0.119) (0.175) (0.114)
Treatment × 0.097 0.124 0.326∗ -0.130 0.072
Other Pol. (0.112) (0.128) (0.135) (0.205) (0.154)
Republican
Other Pol. 0.191∗ 0.266∗ 0.233∗ 0.394∗ 0.146
(0.096) (0.110) (0.115) (0.141) (0.106)
Observations 696 696 696 696 696
p(Tr+ Tr × Rep) 0.000 0.004 0.051 0.005 0.024
p(Tr+ Tr × Neither Rep. nor Dem.) 0.000 0.118 0.059 0.834 0.845
All of the outcomes are indices. The definition of the indices is described in the Online Appendix. The outcomes
from the petition question are self-reported. All outcome variables are normalized by the mean and the standard
deviation of the variable for the control group (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007). In other words, the coefficients
represent the effect size in terms of standard deviations away from the mean. We include the same list of controls
as in Table 2. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001.
2
Table A2: Transatlantic Trend Survey: Randomization Check
Treatment Control P-value
Concerned about immigration 0.07 0.07 0.268
Male 0.45 0.46 0.151
Elementary school 0.11 0.11 0.566
Some secondary 0.16 0.17 0.035∗
Secondary 0.29 0.29 0.598
College 0.28 0.28 0.705
Postgraduate 0.13 0.12 0.026∗
Financials worse 0.45 0.46 0.548
Jobs available 0.92 0.93 0.115
Full-time employed 0.39 0.41 0.188
Part-time employed 0.15 0.14 0.474
Rural 0.74 0.76 0.144
Left-wing 0.30 0.31 0.298
Right-wing 0.41 0.41 0.363
Age 49.18 48.94 0.281
P-value (joint F-test) .1391
Observations 9733 9675 19234
This table presents means for treatment and control groups and the p-
value for the test on whether these two means are statistically different
for the full sample in the two waves of the TATS studied in the text.
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Families of outcomes: Construction of indices
First, we group our outcome measures into different families of outcomes, and create an
index for each family. We use the method described in Anderson (2008) to create the
various indices.38 We define the families of outcomes as follows:
38We first recode the variables such that high values correspond to positive attitudes towards immi-
grants for all variables. We then normalize each variable (i.e., we subtract the mean of the control group
3
• Targeted Beliefs Immigrants: Index of beliefs regarding the five variables tar-
geted by the intervention (characteristics of immigrants and size of immigrant
group). For each of these questions participants choose one of following options:
[Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree.]
– Immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than US citizens.
– Immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than US citizens.
– Immigrants generally learn English within a reasonable amount of time.
– There are currently too many immigrants in the US.
– There are currently too many illegal immigrants in the US.
• General Beliefs Immigrants: Index of beliefs regarding variables not directly
targeted by the intervention.
– Suppose US authorities were able to remove almost all illegal immigrants from
the US. What effect do you think this would have on the US economy? [Very
positive effect, Somewhat positive effect, Neither positive nor negative effect,
Somewhat negative effect, Very negative effect.]
– Over the last 10 years, immigrants have produced more disadvantages than
advantages for the US as a whole. [Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree
nor disagree, agree, strongly agree.]
• Policy Preferences: Index of policy preferences regarding immigration.
– Do you think the number of legal immigrants coming to the United States each
year should be increased, reduced or remain the same? [It should be increased
and divide by the standard deviation of the control group). Finally, we calculate the covariances between
the variables that are part of the same family and use the inverse of the covariance matrix in order to
weigh them. For more details see Anderson (2008).
4
a lot, It should be increased a little, It should remain as it is, it should be
decreased a little, it should be decreased a lot.]
– Do you think that the number of green cards available for immigrants coming
to the United States each year should be increased, reduced or remain the
same? [It should be increased a lot, It should be increased a little, It should
remain as it is, it should be decreased a little, it should be decreased a lot.]
– The government should devote a larger share of its budget to find illegal im-
migrants, and to deport them. [Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor
disagree, agree, strongly agree.]
– Congress should pass a bill to give some illegal immigrants living in the US a
path to legal status. [Strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree,
agree, strongly agree.]
– Which comes closer to your view about what government policy should be
toward illegal immigrants currently residing in the United States? [Deport
all illegal immigrants back to their home country; allow illegal immigrants to
remain in the United States in order to work, but only for a limited amount
of time; allow illegal immigrants to remain in the United States and become
US citizens, but only if they meet certain requirements over a period of time.]
• Petition: Index of people’s willingness to sign a petition.
– Intention to sign: one if says that wants to sign the petition, zero otherwise.
– Self-reported signing: one if says that signed the petition, zero otherwise.
5
